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of the various layers of ethnie identities, which arose over the centuries and
which is largely unknown, is only beginning to unfold through new research. In
8 * a number of instances the opposition between strangers (conquerors) and the
original population may have been an important dividing line. In summary, the
daily reality for the ordinary people living under Fulbe rule in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries must have been one of conflict and political instability,
in which they sometimes participated actively and of which they were at other
times the victims. How this influenced their daily lives will forever be hidden as
there is a silence about their fate in the oral traditions and written sources of
these times.
Colonial conquest in central Madagascar:
Who resisted what?
Stephen Ellis
A rising against French colonial rule m central Madagascar
(1895-1898) appeared in the 197Os as a good example of
résistance to colonialism, sparked by France 's occupation of
Madagascar. Like many similar episodes in other parts of
Africa, it was a history that appeared, in the light of later
African nationalist movements, to be a precursor to the more
sophisticated anti-colonial movements that eventually led to
independence, in Madagascar and elsewhere. In the light of
the later history of nationalism, however, it is instructive to
revisit the rising of the menalamba in Madagascar and to
reconsider the episode.
On 22 November 1895, less than two months after French colonial troops had
taken the Merina royal capital at Antananarivo in their conquest of Madagascar,
there was a violent uprising in a district immediately to the west of
Madagascar's premier city. The violence was directed at local officiais of the
royal government and at prominent Christian converts, but what most shocked
Europeans was the murder of other Europeans: the local missionary family,
British Quakers who had lived in Madagascar for more than twenty years.
William Johnson, his wife Lucy and their baby daughter were hacked to death
by a mob of perhaps a thousand people. French troops retaliated by laying waste
the area surrounding the scène of the Johnsons' murder, burning houses and
killing people more or less randomly in the belief that sévère punishment would
prevent any répétition.' Nevertheless, throughout the followmg weeks there
were reports from many parts of central Madagascar of local disputes of various
1 S. Ellis, The Rising of the Red Shawls: A Revolt in Madagascar, 1895-1898
(Cambridge, 1985).
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sorts getting out of control, fights breaking out at markets, unpopulär village
officials being attacked and church buildings being damaged. In many places
there were reports of exceptionally serious raids by cattle rustlers, sometimes in
bands hundreds strong, and some including Malagasy army deserters with
breech-loading rifles. There were fantastic rumours of impending doom and
disaster.
The French were officially committed to propping up the royal
administration of Queen Ranavalona III, previously regarded by European states
as the ruler of Madagascar although the state that she reigned over had never in
fact controlled more than half the island. Her government was also, to a degree
the French had underestimated, in an advanced state of collapse. The
establishment of a protectorate was the result of lobbying by the French Foreign
Ministry, which had recently achieved some success with a similar policy in
Tunisia and which in principle wished to avoid any more expensive form of rule
in Madagascar. This policy was contested by others in the administration in
Paris, however, including some in the war ministry, members of the French
expeditionary force in Madagascar and the small number of French private
citizens who were already living on the island, most of them dirt-poor Créoles
from the island of Réunion.
In March 1896 there was a wave of attacks on administrative posts of the
Merina royal government in several parts of the central highland région. The
attacks were obviously coordinated, to the point that French officials in
Madagascar sensed at once that this was of a different order from ordinary
cattle-stealing or even from the attack on the Johnson family four months
previously. Rumours spread that the rising was secretly being organized by
Queen Ranavalona, the figurehead of the protectorate government, or by some
of her courtiers. There were even rumours that British missionaries were in
league with the insurgents in spite of the murder of some of their own. Although
these rumours were essentially false, the fact that they were so widely believed
says much about the nature of the insurrection as well as about divisions among
the French. This was, after all, the period of the Dreyfus affair, when French
men and women were bitterly split on a great range of issues, especially those
concerning the rôle of the army.2
The insurgents, who later became known as menalamba (red shawls), were
to keep some semblance of organization until 1898 and posed a serious
2 S. Elhs, 'The Politica! Elite of Tanananve and the Revolt of the Menalamba: The
Création of a Colonial Myth m Madagascar, 1895-1898', Journal of Afneem History
XXI, u (1980), 219-34. Among the documents that Dreyfus was accused of ha ving
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embarrassment to French rule. In August 1896, a senior French officiai on thé
island reckoned that 300,000 people were living in areas under menalamba
control.3 In retrospect, however, it is clear that there was never thé remotest
chance of thé menalamba forcing thé French to abandon their aim of exercising
formai control over Madagascar. On the contrary, the seriousness of the
uprising caused thé government in Paris to develop a more rigorous policy,
declaring Madagascar to be a French colony and sending a military governor
with wide-reaching powers, General Gallieni, to sort out the problem.
While äs many äs 100,000 Malagasy may have died from violence and
hunger during the uprising, the number of deaths of French soldiers and
civilians, more from disease than enemy action, was in the hundreds. The
enormous différence in casualty figures is évidence of the superiority of French
arms but perhaps also indicates something about the menalamba. It may, for
example, suggest that the insurgents did not conceive of themselves as a single-
minded anti-colonial résistance movement. Before exploring this idea further,
however, it is userul to describe briefly the literature produced by Africanist
historians on collaboration and résistance between Africans and colonial
occupiers.
Collaboration and résistance
Particular historical objects or phenomena - in this case, the menalamba rising
- are liable to differing interprétations as times change and new générations ask
questions about the past that seem most important or interesting in the light of
current circumstances. Madagascar remained a French colony from the time of
the menalamba until 1960, and for 12 years afterwards its first post-
independence government continued with many of the policies inherited from
colonial times. For almost 80 years, there seemed little reason for anyone
involved in public life to remember the menalamba other than as a reactionary
opposition to colonial rule by the least educated part of the population of central
Madagascar. Moreover, many Malagasy historians were Christians, who were
often nostalgie about the independence of pré-colonial Madagascar but could
not easily sympathize with those like the menalamba who had burned churches
and killed pastors.
It was only after the uprising of 1972, when Madagascar acquired a radical
nationalist and socialist government, that the memory of the menalamba was
rehabilitated. The government officially commemorated the tragic anti-French
insurrection of 1947, which resembled the menalamba movement in many ways,
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claiming it as a precursor of its own nationalist struggle.4 The first modern book
on the menalamba was published in 1976 by a Malagasy radio journalist who
had devoted a series of programmes to the subject, representing the menalamba
as nationalists who had fought to preserve the island from foreign rule, and
including a whole series of revolts between 1895 and 1905 within this
category.5 It comes as no surprise that the menalamba should have been
identified as nationalists or proto-nationalists at a time when Madagascar was
governed by a radical regime that based its legitimacy on its rejection of neo-
colonialism. In the years immediately after independence there were many
African governments and their supporters that identified themselves in public
with earlier anti-colonial movements. An obvious place to start looking for a
radical anti-colonial pedigree was in the records ofthose people who had fought
against European intruders in the period of conquest or of early colonial rule.
This was the golden age of African nationalism: the period from 1945 until,
perhaps, the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980. It was a period when it was
growingly apparent to people all over the world that colonialism had become an
anachronism, a politically unjust dispensation whose time had passed.
Investigating the extent to which Africans had resisted colonialism was thus
both interesting and politically useful.
It was in roughly these circumstances that collaboration and résistance to
colonial rule were constituted as a field of formal historical inquiry by historians
of Africa intent on recovering the historical records of a continent that
Europeans had often dismissed as being without history.6 A pioneering work in
the new history of African nationalism was Terence Ranger's book on
résistance to colonial rule in Rhodesia, published in 1967 when Ranger was
working at the University of Dar es Salaam's history départaient, a nursery of
talented scholars, in a city that was one of thé main diplomatie hubs of the
southern African libération struggle.7
From the beginning, one of the key thèmes of research on this subject was
the connection between résistance to the imposition of colonial rule (dubbed
'primary résistance' by Terence Ranger) and modern nationalist movements
('secondary résistance').8 One inclination of nationalist historians was to
explore the connections between these two générations of résistance movements
3 P. Bourde, quoted in Elhs, Rising of the Red Shawls, 97.
"Ibid. 158-62.
5 J. Rasoanasy, Menalamba sy Tanmdrazana (Antananarivo, 1976).
6 A notion usefully explored by E. Wolf, Europe and the People Without History
(Berkeley & London, 1982).
7 T. Ranger, Revolt m Soulhern Rhodesia, 1896-1897 (London, 1967).
8 T. Ranger, 'Connexions between "Pnmary Résistance Movements" and Modem Mass
Nationalism in East and Central Africa', Journal of African History, 9 (1968), 437-53,
631-41.
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with a view to determining the extent to which later nationalist movements
might have been the descendants of earlier résisters, or at least with the aim of
exploring the ways in which nationalists drew inspiration from earlier examples
of opponents of colonial rule. Although some prominent commentators pomted
out that the notions of 'collaboration' and 'résistance', redolent of Europe in the
Second World War, were too stark and lacking in nuance to do justice to the
complexity of most African histories,9 studies based on this approach formed a
prominent school of writing in African history.
When I began in 1976 to investigate the history of the menalamba for my
PhD thesis, it seemed obvious that the movement should in the first instance be
considered as a case of résistance to colonial rule. I assumed that further and
more penetrating questions would proceed from this starting-point. It was taken
for granted by most Africanist historians at that time that people whose
countries were being invaded by foreign troops intent on taking formal control
would be naturally inclined to resist this process, so there was little point in
asking why they were fighting. Ranger's work suggested that the key questions
were instead related to the ways in which résisters organized themselves,
whether and in what sensés they could be regarded as nationalists, what the
results of their struggle were, and what effects it had on later nationalist
movements. I soon found, however, that the question of who precisely the
menalamba were and what motivated them was of crucial importance as they
seemed more mtent on fighting certain other Malagasy than they did on fighting
the French or Europeans more generally. Equally, there were large numbers of
Malagasy who showed no interest in the menalamba, who were from the centre
and centre-north of this massive island, more than two-and-a-half times the size
ofBritain.
I found myself being drawn not so much forward in time, as Ranger's model
would imply, in order to look at the effects of the menalamba on later
nationalism, but rather feit myself pulled backwards, to an examination of what
sort of society the menalamba came from. The so-called Kingdom of
Madagascar was something of a jundical fiction. In the eighteenth Century, a
powerful state had emerged in the central région known as Imerina that had
subsequently expanded rapidly through military conquest. Successive rulers of
Imerina after 1817 had called themselves kings and queens of Madagascar,
although in fact they had never succeeded in conquering the whole island. It was
apparent that the expansion of the Merina state had produced all sorts of tensions
9 For example J Suret-Canale, '"Résistance" et "Collaboration" en Afrique Noire
Coloniale', m Etudes Africaines Offertes à Henri Brunschwig (Paris, 1982), 319-31. It
is notable that Suret-Canale was a vétéran communist who had resisted German
occupation in France during the Second World War.
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and enmities tending towards social disintegration. Throughout thé nineteenth
-Century, central Madagascar had witnessed a series of movements of résistance
fo thé royal government in Antananarivo including m thé form of physical flight,
-occasional armed risings, and endémie banditry. The effective overthrow of this
government by French forces m 1895 removed thé last remaining constramts to
a large-scale, violent, settling of scores.
Seen from this perspective, thé menalamba movement was not only, or
perhaps not even primarily, résistance to French colonization but arose from a
tnass of unresolved conflicts whose roots lay in thé pré-colonial history of
Madagascar. Another historian, Gwyn Campbell, has emphasized this aspect to
thé point of doubting whether thé menalamba were nationalists at all,10 but this
is to ignore the politics of thé menalamba. There is clear évidence from their
own letters that thé menalamba were nationalists in thé sensé that many of them
had a conscious notion of Madagascar as a political unity that should be
governed by a single monarch, whom they often called Mpanjakan'
iMadagasikara. This imagined Community under one political rule qualifies as
nationalism. Madagascar was rather différent from many societies of mainland
Africa in that thé Merina Kingdom - alias thé Kingdom of Madagascar -
acquired, before colonial times, many of the hallmarks of what contemporary
Europeans regarded as a state. It had a monarch situated in a capital city who
had an overwhelming armed force at his (or, after 1828, her) disposai and a high
degree of control over a substantial territory, one with an industrious and
generally fixed population. The second king of the ruling dynasty, Radama I
(1809-28) was an autocrat who welcomed contacts with thé British diplomats
and missionaries who sought influence in Madagascar at thé end of Bntain's
global war against France. King Radama had heard of Napoleon Bonaparte and
developed an explicit ambition to be a conqueror like his hero, seeing thé whole
of Madagascar as his natural domain. He was formally recognized by Britain as
thé King of Madagascar in a treaty signed in 1817. Later, France, thé United
States and other Western countries ail recognized thé government in
Antananarivo as thé legitimate ruler of Madagascar, bringing it within thé
juridical field of the leading powers. Radama and his successors adopted a
number of European institutions and technologies to strengthen their power,
including literacy in thé Latin alphabet, thé institution of a state bureaucracy,
and a standing army. They even made an attempt at establishing their own arms
10 This is emphasized m a séries of articles by G. Campbell: 'Missionaries, Fanompoana
and thé Menalamba Revolt in Late Nineteenth Century Madagascar', Journal of
Southern African Studies, 15, l (1988), 54-73; 'The Menalamba Revolt and Bngandry
m Impérial Madagascar, 1820-1897', International Journal of African Historical
Studies, 24, 2 (1991), 259-91; 'The History of Nineteenth Century Madagascar: Le
"Royaume" or "l'Empire"?', Omaly sy Amo, 33-6 (1991-2), 331-79.
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and munitions factories. In 1868-9 the Queen and the Prime Minister converted
to Protestant Christianity and made it into the state religion, and shortly
afterwards established a system of compulsory primary éducation.
Contemplating this chronicle 20 years ago, not only did it seem reasonable to
describe the policy of successive Merina sovereigns and their leading ministers
as a form of nationalism but also it was clear that éléments of a nationalist
ideology had taken root among at least some of their subjects. Even taking
account of the décline in African nationalism as a coherent political force since
the 1980s, which has suggested that its roots are perhaps more complex than
once seemed to be the case, it still seems to me to be justified to describe the
programme of the nineteenth-century Merina government in this way. The main
objection that has been made to this is that the government in Antananarivo
never succeeded in establishing control over more than two-thirds of
Madagascar, and that it extended its rule by the military conquest of other parts
of the island that owed allegiance to independent dynasties and other ethnie
groups outside the Merina heartland. It was, it has been argued, not a national
government at all, but only claimed to be such. According to this argument, the
Merina state had conquered a number of independent peoples, thus being an
empire rather than a national state." But the fact that the kingdom in
Antananarivo inflicted terrible suffering in its campaign to conquer all of
Madagascar, that it was never fully successful in this aim, and that the
government increasingly came under the control of a clique of families from the
central highlands does not detract from the identification of this government as
nationalist in orientation. Part of the signifïcance of the menalamba movement
was that it demonstrated how deeply the nationalist idea had penetrated the
society of the central highlands, the most densely populated area of
Madagascar. It is not necessary for historians to consider nationalism as a noble
or liberating force. Moreover, the various political formations throughout the
island that were conquered by the Merina state did not represent ethnie groups
in the sense that was to become genera! later, under colonial rule. The same
language is spoken in the form of mutually intelligible dialects all over
Madagascar, and every part of the island was influenced over the centuries by
other parts of the island. The different named clusters of population at the
beginning of the nineteenth Century consisted of people of diverse origin who
had adopted collective names in récognition of their political allegiance.12 Many
of the menalamba who claimed they were fighting to restore a properly
" Campbell, 'Nineteenth Century Madagascar'.
12 Cf. P, Larson, 'Desperately Seeking the Merina (Central Madagascar): Reading
Ethnonyms and their Semantic Fields in African Identity Histories', Journal of Southern
African Studies, 22, 4 (1996), 541-60.
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The menalamba leader Rabezavana, Madagascar, 1897
Copyright: FTM Antananarivo
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fünctioning sovereignty to Madagascar were not ethnie Merina in the sensé of
being descended from families that had lived for générations in the central
highlands around Antananarivo. This is the case, for example, with one of the
two most important menalamba leaders, Rabezavana.
What were the menalamba resisting?
In short, the key question that has been asked of the menalamba is what
precisely they were resisting. It is clear that this was not only a movement of
résistance to colonial rule. It was also a campaign against an unpopulär
government that had habitually used extreme brutality, particularly in the
recruitment of forced labourers, and which in its earlier years had organized
massive military expéditions that enslaved people on a large scale and
coincidentally caused numerous deaths from disease and hunger among its own
conscripts. After 1869 this same regime was associated with an official
Protestant church that came to be widely resented. The abuses of this state,
regarded in the emerging system of international law as independent and
sovereign, provoked the anger of the menalamba, to be sure, just as they had
provoked outbreaks of dissent, often in the form of flight or banditry, in earlier
years. But the menalamba were more than bandits, récalcitrants or people
goaded beyond endurance by material demands. They had a clear political
ideology which they expounded in the messages they wrote to each other, in
their public proclamations and in the actions they took. They aimed to restore
the monarchy, if not in Antananarivo then in another holy place of their
tradition, in what they regarded as its proper form. This was a movement of
purification. The insurgents over a very large swathe of central and northern
Madagascar were not resisting the principle of the Kingdom of Madagascar, as
it was officially known and as the menalamba themselves sometimes called it,
but the way in which it had been administered. Indeed, in September 1896 a
large gathering of menalamba from different parts of central Madagascar chose
one of their number to be the new king of Madagascar, to replace Queen
Ranavalona whom they now regarded as illegitimate due to her relations with
the French.13 This may be contrasted with anti-colonial risings in other parts of
Madagascar, notably in the south and southeast in 1904-5, which had no
organizational and little ideological affinity to the menalamba movement. These
were risings by people who did not acknowledge the sovereignty of the kings
and queens of Imerina and had no ambition to construct a single state in
Madagascar. They were motivated most obviously by a refusai to submit to
13 Ellis, Rising of the Red Shawls, 93.
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French rule and by protests against forced labour and colonial exactions and
against the abolition of slavery.
The pénétration of capitalism
That the self-styled Kingdom of Madagascar, ruled by Malagasy until its
démise in 1895-6, was regarded by Europeans as a sovereign entity was to a
considérable extent due to the growing influence of Britain in the Indian Océan.
Foreign influence in the formation of states in Madagascar was not in itself new.
Successive political constructions on the island, going back many centuries, had
been formed from the interaction between existing rulers and foreigners
bringing in powerful political technologies, often of a ritual type.14 The
European traders who frequented the coasts of Madagascar after the sixteenth
Century, buying slaves in exchange for guns, silver coins and manufactured
goods, can be placed in a history of foreigners whose goods and skills were
used as materials for political construction. However, King Radama's treaty
with Britain in 1817 and the arrivai of British missionaries in Antananarivo
three years later was difficult. It signalled the alliance of a powerful Malagasy
king who was developing an ambition to conquer the whole island with a
European state (which had its own political project) able to exert unprecedented
power in the western Indian Océan. The British governor in Mauritius in 1817
had his own reasons for encouraging Radama to become king of Madagascar, to
be an ally against the French and to guarantee an end to slave exports from the
whole island. Unlike earlier générations of European slave-dealers and pirates,
the British wanted not just to trade but also to build a new state, for which they
offered technical, military and fmancial help.
Eighty years after the création of an Anglo-Merina alliance, the menalamba
were resisting a form of governance that, while administered by Malagasy, also
represented a growing European influence. For many of the Queen of
Madagascar's subjects the most obvious manifestation of this was the Christian
church, considered by many to be an essentially foreign form of worship. After
the 1860s, members of the Merina elite, for whom the church was a key
structure of political administration, were increasingly likely to dress in
European clothes, live in European-style houses and have a taste for imported
consumer goods. The material aspects of the church, including its use for the
recruitment of forced labourers and army conscripts and for raising a variety of
taxes, were, before 1895, indistinguishable from its spiritual and ritual aspects.
14 See, m particular, the introduction to F. Raison-lourde, Les Souverains de
Madagascar. L'Histoire Royale et ses Résurgences Contemporaines (Pans, 1983).
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The attempt to construct a Christian state of Madagascar after 1869, that was to
cause such suffering before its collapse, was itself both a product and gauge of
the growth of European influence that had a far-reaching effect even before the
colonial period. The menalamba were fighting a Malagasy élite that they
considered to hâve used brutal and unjust methods to enrich themselves and to
have made common cause with European aggressors. Again, this is apparent in
their own letters and proclamations.
If thé menalamba sprang from a population that had been abused and
economically exploited before the imposition of colonial rule, their greatest
enemies were the members of the Christian elite who had inflicted this on them.
Royal ministers and officials, encouraged by missionaries to consider European
styles of consumption and living as virtuous, used their position to increase their
own wealth and power. This observation could easily lead to a Marxist-tinged
analysis of the pre-colonial elite of Madagascar as a comprador class, whose
economie interest in collaborating with foreign capital determined their political
stance.15 Such a point of view came to be quite widely applied to the analysis of
résistance in Africa, raising the question of whether people who fought against
colonial rule were resisting the imposition of foreign domination as such, or
whether the key determinant was perhaps not in fact the incursion of capitalism.
In the case of Madagascar, capitalism could be said to have had a clear effect
before colonial times on the growth of markets and of a property-owning elite
that traded with the West and made use of international credit.16 Studies of
résistance to capitalism in this vein often took, in the hands of Marxist scholars
such as Eric Hobsbawm,17 a greatly expanded notion of political action, based
on the proposition that infractions of the légal or moral order are tantamount to
an attack on the political order thought to underpin them. Hence, some studies
of African reactions to Western encroachment took an extremely broad
définition of what constituted 'résistance', sometimes considered to include not
only organized military activity against colonial forces but also tax evasion, the
avoidance of forced labour, flight, so-called 'social banditry' and other
manifestations of a refusai to accept the official colonial order. In this way
Africanists came to identify, through documents located in dusty colonial
archives, a whole stream of draft and tax dodgers, vagrants and others who were
now considered as potential proto-nationalists.18
15 A fiilly-fledged Marxist analysis is P. Boiteau, Madagascar Contribution à l'Histoire
de la Nation Malgache (Paris, 1958).
16 Cf. T. Ranger, 'The People m African Résistance: A Review', Journal of Southern
African Studies, 4 (1977), 125-46.
17 E. Hobsbawm, Bandits (Harmondsworth, 1985).
18 For example A.F. Isaacman in collaboration with B. Isaacman, The Tradition of
Résistance in Mozambique: Anti-colonial Activity in the Zambezi Valley, 1850-1921
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An analysis based rigidly on an identification of people's économie interests,
however, does an injustice to historical facts, and particularly thé strong
political or cultural factor in people's behaviour. (Indeed, what is culture except
an attribution of meaning to action?) It behoves an analyst to look at the cultural
forms of behaviour, or in this instance of expressions of opposition to
government. It was demonstrated on many occasions in thé nineteenth Century
that the most effective form of opposition to thé government in Antananarivo
coalesced around an alternative monarch. In more distant parts of Madagascar
this might be a king having an established legitimacy at least in one locality,
such as thé Sakalava kings on the west coast of the island, but within thé area
which had corne under thé control of thé Merina kings thé only politically
articulate rebellions were those based on an alternative king, such as thé
agitation surrounding thé crown prince in the late 1850s, or thé revolt in western
Imerina in 1863-4 where insurgents claimed to be following a king who had
miraculously resurrected or escaped assassination.19
The menalamba revolt initially convinced French colonial officials that the
idea of a Malagasy nation was the construct of a Merina ethnie group (or
perhaps just of its more privileged strata) that was inveterately anglophile, and
that the natural allies of France were therefore to be found in other parts of the
island. This led General Gallieni, the military strong man who defeated the
rising and attempted to create a model colony in Madagascar, to enunciate what
hè called a politique des races, intended to promote the sentiment of solid
ethnie allegiances to France in other parts of the island. His idea was to govern
Madagascar as a series of ethnically homogeneous administrative units, all of
which he hoped would be better disposed to France than the Merina were. This
strategy, however, soon encountered the realization that those people deemed to
be ethnie Merina were the most numerous group on the island, constituting
perhaps a third of the total population. In addition, their traditions of literacy
and submission to bureaucratie government and the logic of markets and cash
payments made the Merina in some ways more useful colonial subjects and
auxiliaries than were the inhabitants of other parts of the island. This, in time,
led to the curious situation where families of the Merina bourgeoisie, who were
generally well placed to dérive advantage from colonization, were sending their
children into the libéral professions and, later, into the upper reaches of the
administration, but still retained the réputation of being fundamentally anti-
(London, 1976). This is also the approach taken m regard to Madagascar by Campbell,
op. cit.
19 F. Raison-Jourde, Bible et Pouvoir à Madagascar au XDfe Siècle (Pans, 1991), 197-
289. On thé agitation around the supposed escape of Radama II, see R. Delval, Radama
II, Prince de la Renaissance Malgache (Paris, 1972).
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colonial. Prominent leaders of the nationalist movement which emerged in the
mid- 1940s were Merina aristocrats, including even relatives of the last queen.20
The prospect of an independence that would restore to power some of the old
slave-owning families of the Merina elite created a powerful counter-movement
in some other parts of the island but most noticeably among the descendants of
slaves in Imerina.21
Even by the 1940s it was clear that Malagasy nationalism was complex
enough to include several different strains, only some of which could be
considered as belonging to the same tradition as the menalamba. At its heart
was not only an aspiration to independence but also a social struggle between
Malagasy. The history of thé menalamba and thé policies used by thé colonial
government to defeat thé movement meant that the memory of the independent
kingdom of Madagascar became an inspiration to nationalists able to point to a
pré-colonial history of national government. Simultaneously however, this
history was divisive, since it reminded some social groups of the exactions they
had suffered under a government dominated by a ruling group of families from
thé central highlands. After 65 years of colonial rule, thé island's populations
became closer than before to ethnie groups in thé modem sensé, with a clear
sensé of régional identity and a reinvented history to fit.
What is left of the résistance debate?
I hâve argued elsewhere that a gréât deal of writing about wars in Africa from
the beginning of the colonial period until the late twentieth Century was
influenced by thé coincidence of Africa's political independence with thé
establishment of African history as an accepted académie sub-discipline, a
process which began in Europe in thé 1940s, and arguably slightly earlier in thé
United States by way of African-American studies.22 The literature on early
résistance to colonial rule is a good illustration of how this synchronism
encouraged a particular view of the past based on a sharp dichotomy between
what historians hâve considered colonial and foreign and what they hâve
identifïed as authentically African. An important aspect of historical research is
20 See the biographical notes in J. Tronchon, L'Insurrection Malgache de 1947 (Paris,
1974), 207-19.
21 J.-R. Randnamaro, PADESMet Luttes Politiques à Madagascar (Pans, 1997).
22 S. Ellis, 'Africas Wars of Liberation: Some Histonographical Reflections', m P.
Konmgs, W. van Bmsbergen & G. Hessehng (eds), Trajectoires de Libération en
Afrique Contemporaine (Pans, 2000), 69-91. For a more extensive survey, J.C. Miller,
'History and Africa/Africa and History\AmericanHistoricalReview, 104, 1 (1999), 1-
32.
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to situate people as far as possible in their own time by trying in thé first
instance to understand what motivâtes them in their own terms. The danger in
identifying any group of résisters of colonial rule as proto-nationalists is its
inherent risk of suggesting that they were motivated by ideas that they did not in
fact hâve. Hence, one of thé main flaws in thé method of identifying primary
and secondary résisters of colonialism, and attempting to incorporate them into
~ acsingle nationalist narrative, is the risk of anachronism which it carries.
s By the same token, it is probably because of the rapidly changing fortunes of
African nationalism in récent years that there have been so few studies of
collaboration and résistance since the 1980s. African nationalism no longer
appears to be as clearly heroic or progressive as it once did. If the debate on
collaboration and résistance to colonialism ended rather abruptly, before any
consensus had been reached or key questions had been really clarifïed, it is
perhaps because of a number of contemporary developments which have served
to complicate our view of the past. I would suggest that the most important of
these is the onset of a new génération of wars. For example, it was in 1982 that
armed clashes between rival Zimbabwean nationalist movements began in
eamest, and within a short time Zimbabwean government forces were
systematically killing thousands of Matabele people on suspicion of supporting
the political opposition.23 Although the details of these events were not widely
known at the time, it was plain that they raised a whole series of questions
. regarding the nature of ethnicity and factional conflict within the nationalist
movements in Zimbabwe, the country which Ranger in particular had placed at
the centre of debates on collaboration and résistance. This implied a need for a
reformulation of discussions about which components of African societies were
most opposed to colonial raie, and on what grounds, and what the conséquence
of their opposition was. In recent years the number of internecine conflicts in
Africa has increased. War in Africa has come to seem such a disturbing
phenomenon not only because of the number of victims it leaves behind, but
precisely because it can no longer be so easily fitted into an explanatory
framework.
The relationship to nationalism of many current wars in Africa is unclear.
Armed conflicts such as those taking place in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan,
Congo and elsewhere today are widely perceived in the West as representing a
new génération of wars thought to have been caused either by the end of the
Cold War or by the impact of globalization, or a combination of the two. In an
alarming number of analyses, these wars are considered a sign of reversion to an
age-old barbarism said to be characteristic of Africa. This point of view is so
23 K.P. Yap, 'Uprooting the Weeds: Power, Ethnicity and Violence in the Matabeleland
Conflict, 1980-1987', PhD thesis, Umversity of Amsterdam (2000).
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prejudiced as to require no further comment.24 In the most eloquent treatments,
Africa's new génération of wars is bracketed together with those in the Balkans,
central Asia and elsewhere as part of a wave of so-called 'new wars'. This has
the considérable merit of considering Africa as an integral part of the world
rather than as an enclave.25
Such an analysis supposes that a historie rupture occurred in or about the late
1980s or early 1990s which resulted in a new wave of wars, and that these
recent wars are of a radically new type. This view, though, does not really stand
up to scrutiny, at least in the case of Africa.26 It is true that dictators were kept
in power in Liberia and Somalia with US assistance until 1990 and 1991
respectively, and that these regimes collapsed more or less with the ending of
the Cold War when the US government decided that it was no longer in its own
interest to continue these relationships. In much the same way, the Mengistu
regime in Ethiopia also finally collapsed in 1991 after the withdrawal of Soviet
support. In all of these cases, however, military violence had already been both
large-scale and systematic for years, taking the form, for example, of major
conventional campaigns in Ethiopia, of substantial ethnie purges in Liberia in
1985, and of the aerial bombardment of a major Somali city, Hargeisa, in 1988.
In other words, many of Africa's most serious wars actually began well before
the end of the Cold War, even if these conflicts took on new forms in the 1990s.
Thus, despite arguments to the contrary, Africa's current armed conflicts go
back further than the last decade and the end of the Cold War. Indeed, as shown
in the introduction to this volume, wars of the current génération are often
directly linked to (or they are even continuations of) struggles that occurred
around the time of independence.27 This should cause us to ask some new
questions about the violence which occurred during colonial times and which
once seemed to be most convincingly explained as résistance to colonialism.
The nature of the colonial relationship, which has been the subject of much
recent research in the field of représentations and identities, now appears more
complex than it did three or four decades ago. The colonial bond did not consist
24 See criticism of the 'New Barbansm' thesis by P. Richards, Fightmg for the Ram
Forest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone (Oxford & Portsmouth NH, 1996),
xiii-xxix.
25 Notably M. Kaldor, New and Old Wars Organized Violence m a Global Era
(Oxford, 1999).
26 The subject of an unpubhshed analysis by R. Marchai & C. Messiant, 'Une Lecture
Symptomale de Quelques Théonsations Récentes des Guerres Civiles', presented at a
meeting in July 2001 of the Centre for Defence Studies, Kmgs Collège, London/Centre
d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, Paris, joint study-group on African wars.
27 Noted in thé introduction to C. Clapham (éd.), African Guerrillas (Oxford, 1998), 1-
18.
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ttfirely of colonial exploiters and suffering natives. Likewise, the aftermath of
l rule in Africa was not simply a contest of continued dependency versus
-determination. There are grounds, therefore, to reconsider thé whole history
îif violence during colonial rule and even up to very récent times within a single
| perspective, taking account not only of the colonial element in such conflicts
|klt also of the social struggles within African societies.
^ ' One aspect of earlier research on collaboration and résistance which has
^Seen vindicated time after time, however, is the extent to which modem African
tt&tionalists have invoked memories of those earlier African leaders who were
; taown to have fought against white colonizers. In Zimbabwe, as Ranger
demonstrated, the same word — chimurenga - was widely used to designate both
* Struggles. In nationalist historiography, figures such as Samory Touré in central
West Africa, Rainilaiarivony in Madagascar or Sultan Rabîh in Chad have been
' fepresented as patriots or proto-nationalists whose military feats could be
• explained primarily by their wish to avoid being incorporated into European-
, ruled states.28
Thèse and many other historical fighters against colonialism do indeed live
, on in populär memory but many of them appear to hâve left a highly ambiguous
: legacy. Rainilaiarivony, thé last prime minister of the pré-colonial kingdom of
' Madagascar, is remembered today in Madagascar but not often as a proto-
nationalist hero. Samory Touré, to take a clearer example, was certainly
regarded by French colonizers as a major opponent, and hè undoubtedly built up
a powerful military force which dominated areas of modem Guinea, Liberia,
Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire in the last two decades of the nineteenth Century.
French colonization of thé Sahel proceeded only after his final defeat. Samory's
' conquests, however, were accompanied by brutal slave-raiding by his
; redoubtable cavalry and thé forced conversion to Islam of peoples living on thé
, historie frontier of Malinke pénétration of the rain-forest.29 Ahmed Sékou
- Touré, thé président who ruled Guinea with such ferocity from 1958 to 1984,
claimed to be a direct descendant of Samory. There are probably as many West
Africans today who hâve heard stories about Samory as a Malinke slave-raider
from thé north as those who know him as a fierce résister of colonialism.
At a time when politics in Côte d'Ivoire and Libéria are marked by a serious
split between Malinke and others, thé particular associations attached to
Samory's name are of obvious relevance. Nationalists could perhaps argue that
state-building, whether in Africa or elsewhere, is generally a bloody business
28 See, for example, Les Africains (Pans, 1977), an eight-volume set edited by C -A.
Julien with contributions from leadmg histonans, and published by Jeune Afrique.
29 Y. Person, Samory, 3 vols (Dakar, 1968, 1975). My own observations concerning
memories of Samory are based on interviews in Libéria and Côte d'Ivoire.
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since it proceeds via an acquisition of a monopoly of violence, and that this no
more disqualifies a Samory as a nationalist hero than it disqualifies a Bonaparte
or a Bismarck. This is true enough, but it is through their historie legacies that
such famous nationalists are judged. The question is not how much force these
people used but what their legacy is. This suggests a need to analyse the nature
of rnemory in societies in which historical traditions are still largely orally
transmitted. The findings of such an analysis would then tell us much about any
particular African nationalism.
Perhaps we are better placed now than a génération ago to realize how
seldom colonial rule took the form of a sudden attack by colonizers on societies
previously innocent of commercial contacts with westerners. African societies
had, in the past, been affected by joint interests or joint ventures in the form of
the slave trade, for example. If the debate on résistance to colonial rule and its
legacies is to be continued, perhaps what is most needed are new studies of
various parts of Africa that dispassionately analyse what we now know of the
nature of modem nationalism.
Revisiting résistance in Italian-occupied
; Ethiopia: The Patriots' Movement (1936-1941)
" f * and the redéfinition of post-war Ethiopia
|' Aregawi Berhe*
During the Italian occupation of Ethiopia, a significant
indigenous résistance movement, the Patriots Movement,
émergea. The nature and impact of this résistance is
reconsidérée! by highlighting aspects of its rôle in
'redefming Ethiopia ', its internai policy and Us position in
the global Community öfter the start of the Second World
War. The résistance movement was based on the Ideals of
restoring national independence and preserving cultural
identity. There is also discussion of the reasons for the
abrupt end to the résistance — mainly due to an external
intervening factor (the British army) and the defeat ofltaly —
which prevented the challenge posed by the résistance
movement and its incipient ideas of political reform being
taken up seriously by the post-war impérial regime.
Introduction
In 1935, Ethiopia, until that time a traditional polity with a predominantly
feudal political system, was invaded by the industrialized nation of Italy under
the Fascist regime of Benito Mussolini. In défiance of the ensuing occupation,
Ethiopians became involved in a multi-dimensional 'patriotic résistance' to
drive the invaders out of their country, fighting against many odds, including
indifférence from the League of Nations and the West. It lasted for five years,
* The author wishes to express his gratitude to Professor J. Abbink for his advice and
comments on this chapter.
